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Abstract
This study investigates whether the likelihood of deal success/failure in merger transactions is 
influenced by the underlying characteristics which tend to affect acquirers’ shareholder returns.
These characteristics include the method of payment (cash versus stock), target status (listed 
versus non-listed targets), diversification (domestic versus cross-border and industry-wide
deals), and acquirers’ prior bidding experience. We also investigate whether announced deals
reflect an expectation about the likelihood of deal completion. The findings from event study
confirm that market reaction is indifferent to whether the announced deals are likely to be
successfully completed or not, consistent with the efficient markets hypothesis. However, the
results from probit regressions confirm that the aforementioned deal characteristics, as well as
certain firm and country level factors, influence the likelihood of whether previously
announced deals are subsequently completed or cancelled.
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1. Introduction
Mergers and acquisitions (hereafter M&As) involve complex deals and their precise impact on 
shareholder wealth is an area that has been debated from various perspectives in the mainstream
literature. One line of research focusses on whether M&As tend to improve or destroy
shareholder wealth, and many studies have examined market reactions to announcements of
M&As using event study methodology. The picture provided by the existing literature
regarding the overall effects of M&As on shareholder wealth, however, is far from clear. While
there is a general trend indicating that target companies tend to earn positive announcement
period returns, evidence on acquiring company (or bidder1) returns has been quite mixed. Most
notably, the literature has related shareholder returns to (i) the method of payment used to
finance the deal, distinguishing between cash or stock payment (or a combination of both), (ii) 
the role and nature of information asymmetry surrounding the status of target firms (whether
publicly-listed or private), (iii) industry or cross-border diversification, and (iv) acquirer
characteristics such as size and experience. Investigation of such relationships is typically
determined by combining event study with regression methods (see e.g. Mulherin and Boone
2000, Kohers and Kohers 2000, Andrade et al. 2001, Beitel et al. 2004, Choi and Russell 2004,
Mai et al. 2009, Martynova and Renneboog 2011, Jaffe et al. 2015).
Another dimension of M&A research relates to the pre-merger characteristics of targets and 
acquirers that affect their likelihood of being involved in M&As. The literature in this regard 
offers evidence relating to both financial and non-financial firms, focussing on specific regions,
such as the USA, Europe, and Asian countries (e.g. Powell 1997, Gonzalez et al. 1997, Ali-
Yrkko et al. 2005, Wheelock and Wilson 2004, Rossi and Volpin 2004, Focarelli and Pozollo
2001, Buch and DeLong 2004, Hannan and Pilloff 2009, Pasiouras et al. 2011). Studies in this
area have largely employed Logit or Probit regressions using samples of involved firms in
M&A transactions (i.e. targets/acquirers) combined with non-involved peers. Owing to the
nature of the investigation, most of the studies in this area have used data on completed M&A 
transactions only, thereby ignoring deals that ultimately failed. 
An interesting extension to this area of research, not explored in previous studies, is to examine
whether specific characteristics influencing shareholder wealth upon merger announcements
will also affect the likelihood that such M&As will eventually succeed or (otherwise) fail. As
noted above, prior empirical studies on shareholder wealth effects of M&As have largely used
1
The terms ‘acquirers’ and ‘bidders’ are used interchangeably as is conventional in the literature.
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completed deals – thus ignoring unsuccessful deals (Mangold and Lippok 2008, Officer et al,
2009, Rani et al. 2014, Jaffe et al. 2015).2 Among other aspects of research on M&As, Hensher 
and Jones (2007) suggest an approach for selecting a suitable predictable model for estimating 
distress firms, while Peat (2007) highlights the importance of developing a hazard-type model 
in the validation of bankruptcy and takeovers. While there is abundance of research on the 
impact of M&As (Baskerville and Hay, 2006), research on predicting the success/failure of
such merger deals is relatively scarce. This study aims to examine the factors affecting the 
likelihood of M&A deal failures once announced.
In the literature there are some related studies which have focussed on analysing successful or
failed takeover deals from various perspectives. Tang (2015), for example, examine acquirers’
termination returns in failed deals and find that acquirer gains vary significantly depending on
target type. Becher et al. (2015) analyse the impact of analyst recommendations on the 
probability of deal success and find that it increases (decreases) along with the favourability of
acquirer (target) recommendations. Malmendier et al. (2016) analyse unsuccessful takeover
bids and find that the targets of cash offers are revalued, on average, by +15% after deal failure,
whereas stock-funded targets returned to their pre-announcement levels. Caiazza and Pozzolo
(2016) investigate the relevance of several characteristics in explaining failed announced deals
from the banking industry, including diversification (domestic versus cross-border deals), the
hostility of the bidder and the presence of multiple potential acquirers. More recently, Alhenawi 
and Stilwell (2017) identify several reasons consistent with relevant theories in explaining
value creation from M&As and the successful completion of such deals, attributing to factors
such as the acquirer’s historical performance and target’s pre-merger value. We built upon this
stand of the literature to analyse the impact of several deal-specific attributes on the probability
of M&A deal failure. In a sense, this strand of research is still in its infancy, and our study adds
to a limited number of recent studies by providing robust evidence based on a worldwide
sample of M&A deals.
With this aim in mind, it seems natural to ask whether the market reaction at the time of deal
announcement reflects an expectation regarding subsequent deal completion, which may be
influenced by specific deal characteristics associated with bidder shareholder returns or pre-
merger risk (Tanna and Yousef, 2019). According to the informational efficiency of markets,
the market reaction at the time of deal announcement should reflect all (publicly) available
2 
Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004: 205) indicated that “to estimate the shareholder gains from
acquisitions, we consider successful and unsuccessful acquisition announcements to investigate whether this focus
introduces a bias in our analysis and find that it does not”.
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information regarding the deal, including both deal and firm-level characteristics. Conversely, 
if the market reflects any uncertainty about deal completion at the time of announcement, this
would be inconsistent with the efficient market hypothesis. The implicit assumption underlying
this reasoning is that the market reaction from deal announcement would be indifferent to the
likelihood of the deal being successfully completed or not. Addressing this kind of enquiry
requires using relevant data for a sample combining both successful (i.e. completed) and
unsuccessful (i.e. cancelled) deals to avoid any sample selection bias, and analysing 
announcement period abnormal returns using event studymethodology supplemented by Probit 
regressions. We undertake a unique study of this kind, using an extensive, global sample of
46,758 M&A deals from 180 countries and 80 industries, which took place between the years
1977 and 2012. 3 
Our results indicate that there are no significant differences in announcement returns between
successful and unsuccessful deals. This indicates that market reaction to deal announcement
does not reflect an expectation of whether deal completion is likely or not, a finding which is
consistent with the efficient market hypothesis - since abnormal returns are not impacted by
uncertainty about deal completion or failure. With regard to specific deal factors, we find that 
domestic and focussed deals are negatively associated with the likelihood of deal failure, while
the effect of diversified deals is positive. This suggests that domestic and focussed deals are
more likely to be successfully completed than cross-border or cross-industry deals, an outcome
which appropriately reflects the higher degree of information asymmetry associated with more
diversified deals. Our results also reveal that cash payment deals increase the likelihood of deal
completion, while the effect of stock payment deals is mixed. This finding may also be
associated with information asymmetry surrounding bidder/target valuation, as cash deals tend 
to be more favourable from the point of view of target companies as a way of distinguishing 
high-value bidders from low-value bidders. We also find that deals involving public targets 
increase the probability of deal failure, relative to deals involving private targets. 
3 
Prior studies in the literature have used much smaller samples, typically less than 1000 deals. To give some 
examples, Raj and Uddin (2013) used a sample of 340 deals in the UK, Rani et al. (2014) used 268 deals, Bhabra
and Huang (2013) used 136 completed domestic and cross-border deals. Studies involving relatively larger
samples include Ahern (2007), who used a sample of 12,942 deals, and Moeller, et al. (2005), whose sample
included 12,023 acquisitions. At the middle of the spectrum, Andrade, et al. (2001) andMartynova and Renneboog
(2011) looked at 3,688 and 2,149 acquisitions, respectively. Fuller, et al. (2002) used 3,135. Faccio, et al. (2006)
looked at 4,429, and the sample of Jaffe, et al. (2015) contained 835 acquisitions of subsidiaries and 2,571
acquisitions of public targets. Our sample, by contrast, is much larger and includes all M&A deals, both completed
and cancelled, obtained from Thomson One Banker SDC M&A Database.
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The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 provides a discussion of the 
sampling procedure used for data collection. Section 3 presents the relevant hypotheses and
outlines the methodological approach. Section 4 discusses the empirical results, which include
univariate tests based on event study results and multivariate analysis summarising the results
of Probit regressions. Section 5 concludes.
2. Sampling and Data Collection
The worldwide sample of deals used in this study, along with associated share price information 
for acquirers, covers 180 countries and 88 sub-industries, which have been chosen on the basis
of data availability. The information is sourced primarily from two databases, SDC M&A
Database and Datastream. The M&A data include, as far as possible, all initial bids announced 
between 1970 and 2012. The criteria for inclusion in the sample are:
1. The acquirer is a public firm.
2. The target is a public, private, or subsidiary firm.
3. The acquirer’s market share prices and local index prices are available in DataStream.
4. The type of transaction is coded either ‘1’ or ‘2’, where 1 = Disclosed Value (indicates all
deals that have a disclosed dollar value, and the acquirer is acquiring an interest of 50% or
more in a target, raising its interest from below 50% to above 50%, or acquiring the
remaining interest it does not already own), and 2 = Undisclosed Value (indicates all deals
that do not have a disclosed dollar value, and the acquirer is acquiring an interest of 50%
or more in a target, raising its interest from below 50% to above 50%, or acquiring the 
remaining interest it does not already own).
5. Status of Transaction: C, W, where C = Completed (the transaction has closed), and W =
Withdrawn (the target or acquirer in the transaction has terminated its agreement, letter of
intent, or plans for the acquisition or merger).
6. Value of Transaction: $1 million or more, i.e. the total value of consideration paid by the
acquirer, excluding fees and expenses. 
7. Percentage of Shares Owned After Transaction: From below 50% up to 100%. This 
represents the number of common shares acquired in the transaction plus any shares 
previously owned by the acquirer divided by the total number of shares outstanding.
Based on the above criteria, the total sample includes 46,758 initial bids, of which 36,489 deals
were successfully completed while 10,269 deals were cancelled. Appendix 1-5 lists the relevant 
details including target and acquirer countries, industries and number of deals per year.
4
    
  
  
      
    
      
        
    
   





      
   
       
     
       
     
    
     
     
   
     
  
       
 
    
   
3. Empirical Strategy 
3.1. Hypotheses 
According to the efficient market hypothesis (EMH), any market reaction to deal
announcement should reflect all available information including relevant deal, firm, or country-
level characteristics. That said, there is always future uncertainty about whether a deal will
eventually be completed or fail once announced. Therefore, it is important to investigate
whether the market reaction around deal announcement reflects an expectation regarding deal 
failure, an assumption that is inconsistent with the EMH. Thus our main hypothesis is whether
market reaction is indifferent to whether announced deals are likely to be successfully
completed or not.
H1: There are no significant differences in announcement period abnormal returns between 
deals that are eventually successful (completed) or unsuccessful (cancelled).
Testing this hypothesis involves an examination of announcement period return differentials
from event study before and after deal announcement, as well as including a factor that reflects 
an expectation of deal completion in Probit regressions. Since our sample includes both
successful and unsuccessful deals, it seems appropriate to consider whether specific deal, firm,
and country-level characteristics influence the probability of deal success/failure once
announced. Hence, it seems sensible to investigate whether the likelihood of deal failure, once
a merger deal has been agreed and announced, is affected by the relevant deal characteristics
that distinguish between (i) cash or stock payment offered for the deals, (ii) deals involving
public and non-public targets, (iii) deals that are focussed versus diversified, and (iv) deals 
distinguished according to acquirers’ previous experience of acquisitions (serial acquirers). As
such, the analysis aims to investigate the following additional null hypotheses:
H2: There are no significant differences in the probability of deal failure between cash and
stock payment deals.
H3: There are no significant differences in the probability of deal failure between focussed and
diversified deals.
H4: Target status (where public on non-public) has no impact on the probability of deal failure.
H5: Acquirers’ prior acquisition experience has no impact on the probability of deal failure.
5
    
  
        
    
  
       
       
    
     
  
       
         
   
   
 
    
       
   
      
    
      
  
          
         
      
       
 
All the above hypotheses are investigated using both univariate analysis, which summarise
event study results, and multivariate analysis using Probit estimation to test the influence of 
relevant conditioning variables on the probability of deal failure. 
3.1 Event Study
We follow Brown and Warner’s (1985) and Fuller et al.’s (2002) event study methodology to
calculate acquirers’ abnormal returns for a up to 10 days before and after the announcement
date. Abnormal returns are calculated by subtracting the actual returns during the event window 
from expected returns (MacKinlay, 1997). Specifically, for acquirer i in period t, the abnormal 
return is calculated as follows:
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐸(𝑟𝑖,𝑡) (1)
where ARi,t is the abnormal return for stock i at time t; ri,t the actual return on stock i at time t; 
and E(ri,t) the expected return on stock i at time t
The expected returns are derived using the market model, which expresses the relation between 
expected and market returns as follows:
𝐸(𝑟𝑖,𝑡) = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑟𝑚,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (𝑡 = −110, … . . , −11) (2)
where rm,t is the market return (determined using a benchmark local market index) at time t; 
and εi,t is the random error term.
The parameters of equation (2) are estimated using acquirers’ daily stock price data (converted 
into returns using log differences) over the period from 110 days to 11 days prior to deal
announcement date. The average abnormal returns (AARs) and cumulative abnormal returns
(CARs) are then calculated according to the formula:
1 𝑁 ̂𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑠 = ∑𝑖=1 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 (3)𝑁 
1 𝑇2 ̂𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑠(𝑇1, 𝑇2) = ∑𝑡=𝑇1 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 (4)𝑁 
̂where 𝐴𝑅 is the calculated abnormal return for each stock i at time t; N constitutes the𝑖,𝑡 
number of deals, and 𝑇1 and 𝑇2 reflect the start and end dates of the event window around the
announcement date.
6
    
  
        
    
    
   
         
  
      
      
      
 
    
  
      
  
    
      
   
     
      
   
    
    
       
           
 
   
    
       
3.2 Probit Regression
The base category for the dependent variable in the probit model, specified below, is that the 
deal is successful after it has been announced. Thus, the dependent variable is binary: equal to 
‘1’ if the deal is cancelled and ‘0’ if the deal is completed:
1 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑙
𝑍𝑖 = { (5)0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑙 
The specification of the probit model takes the form:
Pr(Z = 1 | x) = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑑𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽𝑓𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽𝑐𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 (6)
where α is the intercept term; and βd, βf, and βd are the coefficients associated with the 
corresponding set of explanatory variables representing deal, firm, and country level
characteristics.
In the empirical analysis, consistent with hypotheses H2-H5 above, we include four sets of deal
characteristics, representing the method of payment, target status, diversification, and acquirer
prior bidding experience, along with a host of firm level and country level control variables. 
More precisely, in relation to the method of payment, we distinguish between cash (CSH) and
stock (STC) payment deals. On target status, we distinguish between public (Pub), private 
(Priv) and subsidiary (Subs) targets. In testing the impact of diversification, we distinguish
between domestic and focussed (DAF), domestic and cross-industry (DCI), cross-border and 
focussed (CBF), and cross-border and cross-industry (CBCI) deals. As for acquirer prior
experience (Exp), this is represented by the cumulative number of previous takeovers by the
same acquirer in previous three years.
Taking these factors into account, a detailed empirical specification of the probit model, 
including all the control variables, is as follows:
Pr(y = 1 | x) = 𝛼 + 𝐵1𝐷𝐴𝐹𝑖 + 𝐵2𝐷𝐶𝐼𝑖 + 𝐵3𝐶𝐵𝐹𝑖 + 𝐵4𝐶𝐵𝐶𝐼𝑖 + 𝐵5𝐶𝑆𝐻𝑖 + 𝐵6𝑆𝑇𝐶𝑖 + 𝐵7𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑖 + 
𝑀
𝐵8𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑖 + 𝐵9𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖 + 𝐵10𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖 + 𝐵11𝑉𝑇𝑖 + 𝐵12𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗 + 𝐵13 + 𝐵14𝐴𝑆𝑖 + 𝐵15𝐿𝐼𝑄𝐽 + 𝐵16𝐼𝑃𝑗 + 𝐵 𝑖 
𝐵17𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑗 + 𝐵18𝑃𝑟𝑒_𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎 + 𝜀𝑖 
The control variables included in the above model allow for both firm-level and country-
specific heterogeneity. These are: VTi which denotes the value of transaction, representing 
target size; GDPj represents GDP per capita of country j where the target is located; ASi 
7
    
   
  
        
     





     
           
       
    
         
       







     
          
      
      
      
         
     
     
       
 
represents acquirer’s size; LIQj is the legal institutional quality indicator for target country j; 
M/Bi, the acquirer’s market-to-book ratio on announcement day; IPj denotes investor
protection; CARi is the estimate of cumulative abnormal return for deal i for a three-daywindow
(-1,+1) calculated the event study method outlined above (equation 4); and 𝑃𝑟𝑒_𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖 is the 
acquirer’s ex-ante market risk. Table 1 presents a list of all the variables, including their precise
definitions and relevant data sources.
(Insert Table 1 here)
The inclusion of CAR in the probit model is a proxy intended to reflect the market’s expectation of
deal completion. This enables further testing of hypothesis H1, in addition to the event study results.
The inclusion of Pre-Beta controls for acquirers’ pre-merger risk. Following Tanna and Yousef
(2019), we use the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) to derive an estimate of this variable, 
which effectively measures the firm’s systematic risk (beta before deal). This involves using
simple OLS regression of the acquirers’ daily stock returns on market returns by invoking the
market model with estimation conducted over the period from –110 to –10 working days before
announcement day.
4 Empirical Findings
4.1 Event Study Results
(Insert Table 2 here)
Table 2 presents the announcement period event study results of the acquirers’ abnormal
returns and cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the overall sample and for sub-samples of
completed and cancelled deals. The results uniformly indicate that the abnormal returns
(presented for the overall sample only) increase steadily in the days before announcement date,
peaking up at one day after announcement, and then declining steadily thereafter. Similarly, 
the CARs in all cases (both completed and cancelled deals) increase steadily up to one day after
announcement and then decline thereafter. All returns are statistically significant for windows 
of up to six days before and for 10 days after the announcement date. The abnormal returns 
(AR) for most days prior to day 6 of deal announcement are statistically insignificant but the
CARs are mostly significant at 5% level.
8
    
     
      
    
          
     
     
      
    
      
    
  
   
    
   
      
   
     
    
      
      
   
 
 
      
      
  
 
        
     
      
     
The event study results confirm significant information leakage prior to deal announcements. 
In essence, merger announcements can be anticipated prior to the official date and therefore
significant positive abnormal returns can be expected beforehand. Halpern (1983) argues that 
such leakage may be due to signalling provided by earlier successful bids, or there may be
insider trading. Seyhun (1990) argues that leakages may be due to hubris bias which leads to 
overconfidence and, therefore, overestimation of the merger synergies.
The results also suggest significant post-announcement returns. This arises mainly because new
information about the deals that may be revealed after announcement corrects any market
reaction that was made on the event date (Martynova and Renneboog, 2011). Hence, when the
conditions of the deal become clearer, the market reassesses the quality of the takeover and 
makes downward corrections to the expected returns.
4.2 Univariate Tests
While the results of Table 2 confirm that the CARs are statistically significant and also 
consistent for the subsamples of completed and failed deals, formal testing of hypothesis H1 
requires that the mean differences of the CARs for the two subsamples are statistically
insignificant. Table 3 presents the results of both the parametric t-test and the non-parametric
Mann-Whitney U test of the mean differences for different event windows. All results confirm
that the mean differences are statistically insignificant, which provides strong evidence that the 
market reaction is neutral to whether merger deals are eventually completed or not. In another
sense, this result confirms the semi-strong form of market efficiency, which holds that markets
reflect all publicly available information as revealed in the announcement and/or corporate
disclosures before eventual deal completion or termination.
(Insert Table 3 here)
For preliminary investigation of the hypotheses H2-H5, before formal testing using Probit
estimation, we consider univariate tests of the independence of association between the
dichotomous classification of completed/failed deals and the specific deal categories under
investigation (i.e. target status, payment method, diversification, and acquirer’s bidding 
experience). Since the variable of interest in each case is dichotomous, the appropriate test for
the independence of association when the explanatory variable is also dichotomous is the
Pearson’s chi-squared test. Hence, this test is employed to examine the independence of
association in the appropriate subsamples of completed and failed deals, split according to the
9
    
   
  
  
         
 
        
  
   
 
   
    
     
  
   
      
       
  
 
       
  
 
     
       
      
    
     
      
 
     
        
   
dichotomous deal categories representing target status (public/private/subsidiary), payment 
method (cash/stock), diversification (DAF, DCI, CBF, CBCI), and acquirer’s experience
(serial/non-serial bidder).
Table 4 presents the results of the chi-squared tests for each of the categories, showing 
statistically significant differences between observed and expected frequencies. Here, the test
is for the independence of association between the 0/1 classification of the ‘dependent’ variable
(completed/failed deals) and the 0/1 classification of the relevant ‘independent’ variable, taken
in turn (hence 2x2). It is important to bear in mind that the chi-squared test is meant to only
assess the significance of the association between the categories rather than uncover causal 
relationships. The Pearson’s chi-squared test measures how well the observed distribution of
data fits with the distribution of data that would be otherwise expected (by chance), as if the
variables were independent. The statistical significance of Pearson’s chi-squared and the phi
and Cramer’s V tests determines the association between the two relevant categories of
variables, i.e. whether the relevant category of the independent variable is associated with the
likelihood of a deal being a success or failure. In particular, the positive values of the phi and
Cramer’s V tests reveal that the respective categories have a positive association with the
likelihood of deal failure/success while the negative values indicate the opposite. 
(Insert Table 4 here)
The results in Table 4 clearly indicate the statistical significance (mostly at the 1 percent level)
of the association between the 2x2 categories of variables, although in most cases these
differences, as revealed by the values of the phi and Cramer’s V tests, are small. Most notable 
are the differences in the outcomes that distinguish between target status and diversification.
For instance, the overall sample reveals a lower percentage of failed deals involving publicly
listed targets (19.3%) while the corresponding figures for private or subsidiary targets are
slightly higher (24.6% and 28.5% respectively). As the expected percentage of failed deals is 
22% under the independence of association assumption, there is greater likelihood (relative to
chance) of deals with non-public targets failing. In contrast, deals involving publicly listed
targets are less likely to fail, and these differences in the outcomes between the two categories
of deals are reflected in the negative and positive values of the phi and Cramer’s V tests. Based
on similar reasoning, there is a greater chance of cross-industry and cross-border deals being 
unsuccessful, relative to domestic and focussed deals.
10
    
    
  
     
     
  
   
        
      
      
     
       
      
     
   
      
    
      
 
         
    
         
    
      
       
         
     
   
  
  
   
     
Interestingly, the results in Table 4 also indicate a negative association between method of
payment (cash or stock) and failed deals. Similarly, the association between serial acquirers
and completed deals is also negative. These results indicate that method of payment and prior
bidding experience may be significant factors affecting the probability of deal failure.
4.3 Probit Estimates
As explained in section 3.3, the dependent variable in probit estimation is binary (1/0), 
examining the probability of deal failure relative to deals that are completed. The explanatory
variables include a set of dummy variables to facilitate testing of the hypotheses H2-H5, as 
well as a set of control variables to represent firm-specific and country-specific differences.
Additionally, we include a proxy for investor expectation of deal completion at the time of
announcement, represented by acquirers’ three-day CARs (–1,+1), to provide a supplementary
test of hypothesis H1. In all regressions, we account for industry, country and year fixed effects, 
and a minimal set of control variables which include target size (proxied by transaction value),
target country GDP per capita, and acquirers’ ex-ante market risk (pre-beta). Furthermore, in
some regressions, we include acquirers’ market-to-book ratio and bidder size, and control for
investor protection (legal origin) and institutional quality in target countries. The inclusion of
these additional controls, despite reducing the sample size, serve to assess the consistency of 
the results.
Table 5 presents the estimated results of 11 models aiming to analyse the impact of the above
M&A factors on the probability of deal failure. Models 1-7 are estimated using the full sample
of completed and failed deals for all countries. Here we progressively add the dummy variables 
representing the effects of payment method, target status, diversification, and acquirers’ prior
experience. Model 8-9 include all of these variables (as with models 6-7) and additional control
variables, which lowers the sample size for estimation. Models 10 and 11 are estimated using
data for deals involving only U.S. acquirers and non-U.S. acquirers, respectively. As confirmed
by the values of McFadden’s R2 and adjusted R2, the explanatory power of the estimated model 
increases as more regressions are added.
(Insert Table 5 here)
Consistent with the univariate tests, the probit results confirm that market reaction at the time 
of deal announcement (proxied by acquirers’ CAR) has, in the full sample, an insignificant
impact on the probability of deal failure. Although this finding confirms the neutrality of
11
    
    
   
     
 
  
    
    
 
   
       
   





      
   
     
     
      
  
 
     
      
         
      
          
       
      
                                                          
          
  
market reaction to eventual deal outcome, implying support for hypothesis H1, it should be
noted that the effect of CAR is statistically significant and negative in Models 9-11, and we
attribute this statistical significance to the reduced sample size. On the whole, it is difficult to 
assess the impact of this factor, given that CAR is generally a very imperfect proxy to test this 
hypothesis in regression.
The results also indicate that cash payment deals reduce the probability of merger failure, while
stock payment deals have a mixed or insignificant impact. Thus, payment method does affect 
the prospect of deal success/failure, and our findings therefore reject hypothesis H2. A possible 
explanation of why payment method matters in this regard is due to information asymmetry
surrounding bidder/target valuations. Cash payment deals are more favourable for targets as a
way of distinguishing high-value bidders from low-value bidders. Thus, as Branch and Yang 
(2003) argue, cash deals are more likely to be accepted by targets than stock payment deals. 
However, for U.S. acquirers (model 10), neither of these factors is statistically significant.
With regard to the impact of target status, the results show that the acquisition of public targets 
increases the chances of deal failure while that of private targets has the opposite effect. This 
stands in contrast to the findings of the univariate analysis in which the chi-squared tests
indicated a relatively higher likelihood of deal success for public targets. However, as noted
earlier, the latter reflects the strength of association based on sample proportions and not causal 
effects. The probit results are more credible in light of theoretical arguments which suggest
that public target shareholders are more likely to ‘free-ride’ on bidder offers while private
targets, which tend to have concentrated shareholders, have better negotiating power to ensure
deal success. These considerations suggest that, as with payment method, target status affects 
the probability of deal success/failure, implying rejection of hypothesis H3.
The results also suggest that domestic and focussed deals (DAF) negatively influence the
likelihood of deal failure, while diversified deals (here represented by cross-border and cross-
industry –CBCI - deals) positively influence this likelihood.4 This implies that diversified deals
are more likely to fail compared to focussed deals, and this outcome is consistent with the 
univariate tests. The result is plausible and can be explained by greater uncertainty associated
with diversified deals. Evidence shows that greater positive acquirer returns are achieved from
such deals relative to domestic and focussed transactions (see e.g. Danbolt and Maciver 2012). 
4 
We have omitted other diversification categories (DCI, CBF) from the results as their effects are similar.
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Even though synergy gains may be higher from diversification, transaction and monitoring
costs associated with such deals may represent a barrier to their successful completion. On the
whole, the results suggest that diversification affects the probability of deal success/failure, 
implying rejection of hypothesis H4.
Turning to the impact of acquirers’ bidding experience, the results are mixed in that the impact
is positive in some cases and negative in others. In general, acquirers with prior experience
ought to have greater expertise in ensuring deal success, although this does not automatically
mean that they make efficient decisions. The hubris or over-optimism motives of mergers, 
which stands in contrast to the rational, synergy-based theories, suggest that serial acquirers 
tend to destroy rather than improve shareholder value (Roll, 1986). Taking these considerations 
into account, it is not surprising that acquirers’ prior experience has an impact, albeit mixed,
on the probability of deal success/failure, implying rejection of hypothesis H5.
As for the effect of the control variables, both target size and acquirers Pre-beta have a negative
impact on the probability of deal failure. This implies that larger target size higher pre-merger
risk of acquirers increase the chances of deal success, both these effects being consistent with 
greater synergy gains normally expected from larger or riskier deals. The influence of Pre-
beta, however, becomes insignificant in after controlling for the effects of market-to-book
ration and bidder size whose influences are statistically significant (models 9-11). The negative
influence of bidder size is consistent with the expectation of greater synergy from completion, 
thus reducing the prospect of failure. Larger deals are likely to incur higher costs and require
specialist resources (e.g. financial advisors) to which big acquirers are better able to commit,
implying greater chances of deal completion. Among the country-level factors, higher GDP
per capita for target countries decreases the probability of deal failure, as bigger economies 
have larger markets for corporate control with more financial resources to complete deals. Also, 
stronger legal and institutional quality in target countries reduce the probability of deal failure
due to better provisions for property rights protection. On the other hand, stronger investor
protection in common law countries has the effect of increasing the prospect of deal failures. 
Anderson et al. (2009) argue that strong investor protection in a target country affords higher
bargaining power to targets, and Hagendorff et al. (2008) argue that investors in relatively
unprotected environments may require compensation for these lower governance standards and
face a higher risk of expropriation by insiders. These considerations are more likely to
adversely affect the chances of deal success and may be one of the reasons for a similarly
positive effect of diversified deals. 
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5 Conclusion
This paper investigates whether the likelihood of deal success/failure in M&A transactions is
influenced by four main deal characteristics that typically influence shareholder wealth upon
merger announcements: method of payment, target status, diversification, and acquirers’ prior
bidding experience. Our study makes a contribution by providing robust evidence using a very
large and diverse sample of M&A deals and investigating not only the impact of the 
aforementioned characteristics on the probability of deal failure, but also weather market
reaction at the time of deal announcement reflects an expectation regarding subsequent deal
completion. To our best knowledge, such issues have not been previously examined in the 
literature.
Using a worldwide sample of 45,758 deal announcements, comprising both completed and 
failed deals, covering 180 countries and 88 industries between the years 1977 and 2012, we
carry out both event study and probit regressions to address our objectives. The event study
and univariate tests results reveal no significant differences in acquirer returns from successful
and unsuccessful deals, suggesting that market reaction upon deal announcements is consistent
with the efficient market hypothesis since the returns are not impacted by uncertainty about
eventual deal completion or cancellation.
Results from probit regressions suggest that payment method (cash/stock), target status 
(public/private), diversification (focussed/diversified deals) and acquirers’ prior experience
(serial/non-serial) are all relevant considerations in ensuring the eventual completion of deals 
following merger announcements. In particular, focussed deals are more likely to succeed than 
diversified deals, given greater levels of uncertainty associated with the latter. As diversified
deals are more costly, their chances of successful completion are generally lower than focussed
deals.
The results also reveal that cash payment deals reduce the probability of deal failure, while the 
impact of stock payment deals are insignificant. This finding can also be associated with
information asymmetry surrounding bidder/target valuation, since cash deals tend to be more
favourable for target companies as a way of distinguishing high-value bidders from low-value
bidders. With regard to target status, we find that deals involving public targets increase
probability of failure compared to deals involving private targets. These findings also make
sense in light of theory suggesting that private targets, which tend to have more concentrated
14
    
        
    
    
      
    
       
      
     
     
      
   
       




shareholders, have more negotiating power to aid in eventual deal completion. As for acquirers’
prior experience, the findings are mixed.
The results of our study offer some practical implications for managers and regulators. The
most relevant inference from our analysis can be drawn from the diversification perspective,
particularly if viewed in connection with our evidence regarding target status and payment 
method. While M&As play an important role in the corporate world by facilitating the
reallocation of the merged companies’ assets for potential synergy gains, there is persistent
‘home country bias’ in that most M&A deals tend to focussed rather than diversified, even
though the former may yield relatively lower returns for acquirers. To facilitate greater
integration of corporate assets across the world, regulators would be interested in identifying
barriers to cross-industry or cross-border consolidation which could lead to improved welfare
for all stakeholders. Our results indicate that such integration can be aided by multinationals
using cash payments for purchasing private/subsidiary targets abroad, as such deals are more
likely to be successfully completed.
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Table 1: Variable Definitions
DAFi : dummy variable equal to 1 for deal i if the acquirer and target are located in the same country and
operate in the same industry, 0 otherwise.
DCIi : dummy variable equal to 1 for announcement i if the acquirer and target are located in the same country
but operate in different industries (according to the initial two digits of their four-digit SIC codes), 0 otherwise.
CBFi : dummy variable equal to 1 for announcement i if the acquirer and target operate in the same industry but
are located in different countries, 0 otherwise.
CBCIi : dummy variable equal to 1 for announcement i if the acquirer and target are located in different countries
and operate in different industries (according to the initial two digits of their four-digit SIC codes), 0 otherwise.
CSHi : dummy variable equal to 1 for announcement i if the acquirer paid by cash only, and 0 otherwise.
STCi : dummy variable equal to 1 for announcement i if the acquirer paid by stock only, 0 otherwise.
Pubi : dummy variable equal to 1 for announcement i if the target is a public company, 0 otherwise.
Privi : dummy variable equal to 1 for announcement i if the target is a private company, 0 otherwise.
Subsi : dummy variable equal to 1 for announcement i if the target is a subsidiary company, 0 otherwise.
Expi : cumulative number of takeovers by the same acquirer during a three-year period. In regressions, for brevity,
we only present results for experience for the three-year period, although univariate analysis we present results
for three-year and five-year periods.
VTi : logarithm of value of transactions for deal i (in US $mil, i.e. total value of consideration paid by the acquirer
excluding fees and expenses) to represent target size. Source: Datastream
GDPj : logarithm of GDP per capita of country j (target countries). Source: Datastream
M/Bi : acquirer’s market-to-book ratio on announcement day. Source: Datastream
ASi : logarithm of market value in US $mil of acquirer i (calculated by multiplying the total number of bidder
shares times its stock price four weeks prior to the announcement date), to represent Acquirer’s size. Source: 
Datastream
LIQj : quality of institutions represented by the legal institutional quality indicator. (Source: Kuncic 2014)
IPj : dummy variable equal to 1 if the target is located in a country that applies common law (investor protection),
0 otherwise.
CARi : cumulative abnormal return for deal i for a three-day window (-1,+1), calculated using an event study
method and market model. Source: Authors calculation using equation 4.
𝑃𝑟𝑒_𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖 : acquirer’s ‘beta before deal’ calculated from –110 to –11 working days before the announcement
day. Source: Authors calculation (Tanna and Yousef, 2019)
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Table 2: Announcement Period Returns for Acquirers
Abnormal returns (ARs) and cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) have been calculated using the market
model, i.e. by subtracting the actual returns made during the event window from the expected returns based on
the projections of the market model during the event period. The AR results are presented for event windows
up to ten days before and after the announcement date (-10,+10). Deal announcement date is day 0. The sample
consists of 46,758 initial bids announced in 180 countries covering 88 sub-industries over the period 1977-
2012, where 36,489 deals were completed and 10,269 were cancelled. The symbols ****, **, and * denote
statistical significance at the levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.





Day ARs % CARs% CARs % CARs %
-10 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.09
-9 0.07*** 0.1*** 0.07** 0.2**
-8 0.02 0.12*** 0.11*** 0.14
-7 0.02 0.14*** 0.12** 0.22*
-6 0.08*** 0.22*** 0.17*** 0.39***
-5 0.12*** 0.34*** 0.26*** 0.63***
-4 0.11*** 0.45*** 0.37*** 0.75***
-3 0.13*** 0.59*** 0.49*** 0.92***
-2 0.18*** 0.76*** 0.64*** 1.2***
-1 0.31*** 1.07*** 0.87*** 1.79***
0 0.83*** 1.9*** 1.66*** 2.75***
1 0.44*** 2.34*** 2.13*** 3.06***
2 -0.03*** 2.31*** 2.16*** 2.82***
3 -0.12*** 2.18*** 2.07*** 2.59***
4 -0.12*** 2.06*** 1.99*** 2.33***
5 -0.12*** 1.94*** 1.92*** 2.04***
6 -0.09*** 1.85*** 1.81*** 2.0***
7 -0.1*** 1.75*** 1.75*** 1.75***
8 -0.1*** 1.65*** 1.69*** 1.53***
9 -0.13*** 1.52*** 1.57*** 1.34***
10 -0.11*** 1.4*** 1.5*** 1.07***
Table 3: Tests of mean differences in CARs: Completed versus Failed Deals.
An independent samples t-test and a Mann-Whitney U Test are employed to compare the differences in the CARs
of completed and terminated deals. Since the CARs are not usually normally distributed, both the t-test and the U
test are applied for consistency checks. Tests are shown for event windows of: (-5,+5), (-3,+3), (-2,+2), and (-1,+1).
Of the overall sample of 46,789 deals, 36,489 were completed, and 10,269 were cancelled. ‘Yes’/‘No’ indicates
the number of deals completed/cancelled. The symbols ****, **, and * denote statistical significance at the levels
of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.


















































    
  
               
           
            
           
            
                 
            
         
         
           
            
             
           
            
  




   
 





          
             
             
             
              
              
             
             
              
             
              






















Table 4: Pearson’s Chi-Squared Tests for Deal Categories.
This table shows the results of Pearson’s chi-squared test and the phi and Cramer’s V statistics which have been used to
assess the independence of the association between two groups of categorical variables (hence 2x2). The first categorical 
(dependent) variable distinguishes between failed (1) and completed (0) deals. The second categorical variable is one of
the dichotomous (1/0) independent variables listed in the table. These variables are 1) public: when the bidder acquires
public target. 2) Priv: when the bidder acquires private target. 3) Sub.: when the bidder acquires an unlisted subsidiary
target. (4) Cash-only: when the bidder used cash only for payment of the deal. (5) Stock-only: when the bidder used stock
only as payment method. 6) Domestic and focussed deals (DAF): bidder and target are located in the same country and
operate in the same industry. 7) Domestic cross-industry deals (DCI): bidder and target are located in the same country
but operate in different industries (according to the initial two digits of their four-digit SIC codes). 8) Cross-border
focussed deals (CBF): bidder and target operate in the same industry but are located in different countries. 9) Cross-border
cross-industry deals (CBCI): bidder and target are located in different countries and operate in different industries. 10)
Exp. 5Y: when the same bidder has two or more completed deals over the five preceding years. 11) Exp. 3Y: when the 
same bidder has two or more completed deals over the three preceding years. In each of these categories, Yes denotes 
failed deals, No otherwise (completed). The symbols ****, **, and * denote statistical significance at the levels of 1%, 
5%, and 10%, respectively.

















Public 2698 11315 3078 10935 19.3% 80.7% 22% 78% 85.65 .000*** -.043 .000***
Priv. 5413 16609 4836 17186 24.6% 75.4% 22% 78% 52.41 .000*** .033 .000***
Sub. 3058 7665 2355 8368 28.5% 71.5% 22% 78% 348.95 .000*** .086 .000***
Cash Only 2591 10668 2912 10347 19.5% 80.5% 22% 78% 63.27 .000*** -.037 .000***
Stock Only 2371 9310 2565 9116 20.3% 79.7% 22% 78% 25.16 .000*** -.023 .000***
DAF 3708 14762 4056 14414 20.1% 79.9% 22% 78% 63.38 .000*** -.037 .000***
DCI 4041 13024 3748 13317 23.7% 76.3% 22% 78% 46.28 .000*** .031 .000***
CBF 1297 4924 1366 4855 20.8% 79.2% 22% 78% 5.19 .023** -.011 .023**
CBCI 1223 3779 1099 3903 24.5% 75.5% 22% 78% 20.23 .000*** .021 .000***
Exp. 5-Y 5058 20005 5504 19559 20.2% 79.8% 22% 78% 99.96 .000*** -.046 .000***
Exp. 3-Y 4398 17111 4724 16785 20.4% 79.6% 22% 78% 53.33 .000*** -.034 .000***
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Table 5: Probit Estimates for Probability of Deal Failure
The dependent variable is binary, representing the probability of deal failure/success (coded as ‘0’ for successful deals and ‘1’ for failed
deals). The independent variables are: (1) logarithm of transaction values. (2) logarithm of the GDP per capita of the target country. (3)
Domestic and focussed deals (DAF): bidder and target are located in the same country and operate in the same industry. (4)
Cross-border cross-industry deals (CBCI): bidder and target are located in different countries and operate in different industries.
(5) Cash-only: when the bidder used cash only for payment of the deal. (6) Stock-only: when the bidder used stock only as
payment method; (6) public: when the bidder acquires public target. (7) Priv: when the bidder acquires private target. (8) ‘Exp.
3Y’ is the cumulative number of deals by the same acquirer during the preceding three years. (9) Legal Ins Quality (Target) : proxy for
institutional environment. (10) Common Law : proxy for investor protection. (11) CARs (-1,+1): acquirers’ three-day CARs (–1,+1). (12) 
Pre-Beta: acquirer’s ‘beta before deal’ calculated from –110 to –10 working days before the announcement day; (12) Bidder size: the
acquirer’s market capitalisation four weeks prior to announcement day. Models 1-9 are estimated using available data for all countries.
Models 10 and 11 are estimated on data available for deals involving U.S. acquirers and non-U.S. acquirers only, respectively. Estimation is 
by maximum likelihood with p-values shown in parentheses. All estimations include year and industry effects, as well as country effects
where possible (subject to avoidance of multicollinearity).
Probit (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
No. obs 45631 45631 45631 45631 45631 45631 45631 39393 25938 10816 15122
McFadden R2 0.062 0.060 0.062 0.065 0.067 0.068 0.074 0.103 0.127 0.078 0.117
Adjusted R2 0.062 0.060 0.062 0.065 0.067 0.068 0.073 0.102 0.125 0.073 0.115
Constant 2.128 2.106 2.128 2.246 2.247 2.305 2.102 2.037 2.572 1.437 2.073
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Value of Trans. -0.048 -0.048 -0.047 -0.068 -0.067 -0.071 -0.071 -0.080 -0.025 0.048 -0.040
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP (Target) -0.559 -0.567 -0.556 -0.576 -0.545 -0.557 -0.559 -0.502 -0.578 -0.362 -0.483
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DAF -0.031 -0.046 -0.040 -0.044 -0.063 -0.053 -0.051 -0.091 -0.011
(0.035) (0.002) (0.007) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.012) (0.010) (0.670)
CBCI 0.059 0.063 0.060 0.066 0.057 0.086 0.123 0.042 0.089
(0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.002) (0.001) (0.068) (0.013)
Cash-Only -0.148 -0.149 -0.166 -0.166 -0.168 -0.158 -0.174 -0.104 -0.031 -0.119
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.473) (0.000)
Stock-Only 0.055 0.005 -0.018 0.004 -0.002 -0.006 0.037 -0.072 -0.024 -0.053
(0.001) (0.756) (0.295) (0.802) (0.919) (0.736) (0.047) (0.003) (0.535) (0.102)
Public 0.219 0.103 0.082 0.218 0.180 0.441 0.038
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.302)
Private -0.224 -0.173 -0.182 -0.098 -0.159 -0.085 -0.102
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.145) (0.000)
Exp. 3-Y -0.018 -0.018 -0.016 0.012 0.021 0.003
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.001) (0.715)
Legal Ins Quality (Target) -0.293 -0.284 -0.257 -0.283
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Common Law (Target) 0.284 0.292 0.268 -0.068 0.366
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.416) (0.000)
CARs(-1,+1) -0.047 -0.037 -0.050 -0.011 -0.023 -0.017 -0.023 -0.043 -0.303 -0.308 -0.260
(0.363) (0.468) (0.327) (0.835) (0.652) (0.748) (0.649) (0.439) (0.000) (0.009) (0.015)
Pre-Beta -0.032 -0.034 -0.032 -0.030 -0.033 -0.029 -0.028 -0.022 0.012 -0.020 0.063
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.016) (0.336) (0.291) (0.000)
M/B Ratio 0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.659) (0.662) (0.596)
Bidder Size -0.091 -0.158 -0.063
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Country Dumm. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Industry Dumm. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Appendix 1: M&A Deals According to Country of Target
Target Country
Country No % Country No % Country No %
Albania 5 .011 Greenland 1 .002 Panama 18 0.038




Antigua 5 .011 Guatemala 10 .021 Paraguay 4 0.009
Argentina 137 .293 Guernsey 16 .034 Peru 91 0.195
Armenia 5 .011 Guyana 10 .021 Philippines 179 0.383
Aruba 1 .002 Haiti 1 .002 Poland 261 0.558
Australia 2089 4.468 Honduras 1 .002 Portugal 89 0.190
Austria 65 .139 Hong Kong 914 1.955 Puerto Rico 18 0.038
Bahamas 8 .017 Hungary 33 .071 Qatar 7 0.015
Bahrain 1 .002 Iceland 15 .032 Rep of Congo 7 0.015
Bangladesh 6 .013 India 455 .973 Reunion 1 0.002
Barbados 7 .015 Indonesia 287 .614 Romania 52 0.111
Belarus 5 .011 Iran 1 .002 Russian Fed 239 0.511
Belgium 160 .342 Iraq 7 .015 Rwanda 1 0.002
Belize 4 .009 IrelandRep 154 .329 Saudi Arabia 20 0.043
Bermuda 46 .098 Isle of Man 14 .030 Senegal 1 0.002
Bolivia 10 .021 Israel 192 .411 Serbia 9 0.019




Botswana 3 .006 Jamaica 4 .009 Seychelles 4 0.009
Brazil 547 1.170 Japan 2968 6.348 Sierra Leone 2 0.004
British Virgin 84 .180 Jersey 11 .024 Singapore 489 1.046
Brunei 3 .006 Jordan 12 .026 Slovak Rep 15 0.032
Bulgaria 31 .066 Kazakhstan 24 .051 Slovenia 20 0.043
Burkina Faso 5 .011 Kenya 3 .006 Solomon Is 1 0.002
Burundi 1 .002 Kuwait 27 .058 South Africa 445 0.952
Cambodia 6 .013 Kyrgyzstan 17 .036 South Korea 1222 2.613
Cameroon 2 .004 Laos 6 .013 Spain 383 0.819
Canada 3127 6.688 Latvia 7 .015 Sri Lanka 10 0.021
Cape Verde 1 .002 Lebanon 5 .011 Sudan 3 0.006
Cayman
Islands
14 .030 Liberia 2 .004 Surinam 1 0.002
Chile 135 .289 Lithuania 21 .045 Swaziland 2 0.004
China 3087 6.602 Luxembourg 34 .073 Sweden 477 1.020
Colombia 86 .184 Macau 4 .009 Switzerland 194 0.415
Costa Rica 6 .013 Macedonia 6 .013 Syria 1 0.002
Croatia 23 .049 Madagascar 2 .004 Taiwan 269 0.575
Cuba 1 .002 Malaysia 1190 2.545 Tajikistan 3 0.006
Cyprus 40 .086 Mali 6 .013 Tanzania 9 0.019
Czech
Republic
73 .156 Malta 7 .015 Thailand 287 0.614
Czechoslovakia 3 .006 Marshall Is 2 .004 Togo 1 0.002
Dem Rep
Congo
3 .006 Mauritania 3 .006 Trinidad&Tob 8 0.017
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Denmark 166 .355 Mauritius 10 .021 Tunisia 4 0.009
Dominican Rep 9 .019 Mexico 168 .359 Turkey 125 0.267
Ecuador 14 .030 Moldova 3 .006 Turkmenistan 2 0.004
Egypt 42 .090 Monaco 9 .019 Turks/Caicos 1 0.002
El Salvador 3 .006 Mongolia 16 .034 Uganda 3 0.006
Eritrea 1 .002 Montenegro 2 .004 Ukraine 52 0.111




Ethiopia 3 .006 Mozambique 7 .015 United States 17376 37.162
Falkland Is 2 .004 Namibia 19 .041 Uruguay 12 0.026




4 .009 Uzbekistan 3 0.006
Finland 227 .485 Netherlands 327 .699 Vanuatu 1 0.002
Fr Polynesia 1 .002
New
Zealand
148 .317 Venezuela 25 0.053
France 737 1.576 Nicaragua 11 .024 Vietnam 39 0.083




Georgia 5 .011 Niue 2 .004 Yemen 1 0.002
Germany 606 1.296 North Korea 2 .004 Yugoslavia 5 0.011
Ghana 11 .024 Norway 341 .729 Zambia 9 0.019
Gibraltar 2 .004 Oman 6 .013 Zimbabwe 5 0.011
Greece 126 .269 Pakistan 13 .028 Total 46758 100
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Appendix 2: M&A Deals According to Country of Acquirer
Acquirer Country
Country No % Country No % Country No %
Argentina 51 .109 Hong Kong 1089 2.329 Papua N Guinea 5 .011
Australia 2168 4.637 Hungary 28 0.060 Peru 32 .068
Austria 73 .156 Iceland 35 0.075 Philippines 159 .340
Bahamas 7 .015 India 504 1.078 Poland 201 .430
Bahrain 3 .006 Indonesia 167 0.357 Portugal 73 .156
Belgium 159 .340 IrelandRep 197 0.421 Puerto Rico 10 .021
Belize 6 .013 Isle of Man 17 0.036 Qatar 12 .026
Bermuda 72 .154 Israel 205 0.438 Romania 4 .009
Brazil 373 .798 Italy 323 0.691 Russian Fed 159 .340
British Virgin 6 .013 Japan 3314 7.088 Saudi Arabia 15 .032
Bulgaria 9 .019 Jersey 11 0.024 Singapore 579 1.238
Cambodia 1 .002 Jordan 6 0.013 Slovak Rep 2 .004
Canada 3813 8.155 Kenya 1 0.002 Slovenia 15 .032
Cayman Islands 9 .019 Kuwait 38 0.081 South Africa 417 .892
Chile 72 .154 Latvia 1 0.002 South Korea 1282 2.742
China 2483 5.310 Lebanon 4 0.009 Spain 395 .845
Colombia 35 .075 Liechtenstein 1 0.002 Sri Lanka 5 .011
Croatia 8 .017 Luxembourg 29 0.062 Sweden 555 1.187
Cyprus 31 .066 Malaysia 1279 2.735 Switzerland 248 .530
Czech Republic 13 .028 Malta 4 0.009 Taiwan 279 .597
Denmark 141 .302 Mexico 94 0.201 Tanzania 1 .002
Egypt 28 .060 Morocco 5 0.011 Thailand 249 .533
Estonia 9 .019 Namibia 1 0.002 Togo 1 .002
Faroe Islands 1 .002 Neth Antilles 5 0.011 Turkey 77 .165
Finland 279 .597 Netherlands 311 0.665 Ukraine 6 .013
France 713 1.525 New Zealand 80 0.171 United Kingdom 5157 11.029
Germany 483 1.033 Nigeria 2 0.004 United States 17434 37.286
Ghana 4 .009 Norway 321 0.687 Uruguay 1 .002
Gibraltar 4 .009 Oman 5 0.011 Utd Arab Em 19 .041
Greece 169 .361 Pakistan 4 0.009 Venezuela 7 .015
Guernsey 33 .071 Panama 2 0.004 Vietnam 20 .043
Total 46758 100.0
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Appendix 3: M&A Deals According to Years of Study
Year No % Year No %
1977 1 0.002 1995 1331 2.847
1978 18 0.038 1996 1651 3.531
1979 10 0.021 1997 1937 4.143
1980 46 0.098 1998 2021 4.322
1981 242 0.518 1999 2214 4.735
1982 273 0.584 2000 2633 5.631
1983 356 0.761 2001 1942 4.153
1984 401 0.858 2002 1571 3.360
1985 203 0.434 2003 1743 3.728
1986 304 0.650 2004 2274 4.863
1987 358 0.766 2005 2589 5.537
1988 425 0.909 2006 3071 6.568
1989 520 1.112 2007 3512 7.511
1990 371 0.793 2008 2898 6.198
1991 471 1.007 2009 2376 5.081
1992 634 1.356 2010 2628 5.620
1993 866 1.852 2011 2708 5.792
1994 1134 2.425 2012 1026 2.194
Total 46758 100
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Appendix 4: No of M&As based on Acquirer Industry 
Acquirer Mid Industry
Mid Industry No. % Mid Industry No. %
Advertising & Marketing 535 1.14 IT Consulting & Services 1469 3.14
Aerospace & Defense 349 0.75 Legal Services 5 0.01
Agriculture & Livestock 262 0.56 Machinery 1118 2.39
Alternative Energy Sources 82 0.18 Metals & Mining 3530 7.55
Alternative Financial Investments 371 0.79 Motion Pictures / Audio Visual 389 0.83
Apparel Retailing 115 0.25 National Agency 1 0.00
Asset Management 578 1.24 Non Residential 106 0.23
Automobiles & Components 778 1.66 Oil & Gas 2362 5.05
Automotive Retailing 150 0.32 Other Consumer Products 910 1.95
Banks 3895 8.33 Other Energy & Power 223 0.48
Biotechnology 382 0.82 Other Financials 1574 3.37
Broadcasting 286 0.61 Other Healthcare 6 0.01
Brokerage 449 0.96 Other High Technology 69 0.15
Building/Construction & Engineering 1371 2.93 Other Industrials 945 2.02
Cable 167 0.36 Other Materials 130 0.28
Casinos & Gaming 145 0.31 Other Media & Entertainment 5 0.01
Chemicals 854 1.83 Other Real Estate 794 1.70
Computers & Electronics Retailing 122 0.26 Other Retailing 341 0.73
Computers & Peripherals 931 1.99 Other Telecom 91 0.19
Construction Materials 597 1.28 Paper & Forest Products 443 0.95
Containers & Packaging 288 0.62 Petrochemicals 152 0.33
Credit Institutions 152 0.33 Pharmaceuticals 1012 2.16
Discount and Department Store Retailing 256 0.55 Pipelines 67 0.14
Diversified Financials 16 0.03 Power 623 1.33
Ecommerce / B2B 135 0.29 Professional Services 1293 2.77
Educational Services 146 0.31 Public Administration 6 0.01
Electronics 1004 2.15 Publishing 583 1.25
Employment Services 249 0.53 Real Estate Management 229 0.49
Food & Beverage Retailing 576 1.23 Recreation & Leisure 154 0.33
Food and Beverage 1360 2.91 REITs 699 1.49
Government Sponsored Enterprises 2 0.00 Residential 27 0.06
Healthcare Equipment & Supplies 1016 2.17 Semiconductors 765 1.64
Healthcare Providers & Services (HMOs) 610 1.30 Software 1810 3.87
Home Furnishings 172 0.37 Space and Satellites 26 0.06
Home Improvement Retailing 40 0.09 Supranational 2 0.00
Hospitals 142 0.30 Telecommunications Equipment 602 1.29
Hotels and Lodging 230 0.49 Telecommunications Services 750 1.60
Household & Personal Products 235 0.50 Textiles & Apparel 666 1.42
Industrial Conglomerates 47 0.10 Tobacco 48 0.10
Insurance 789 1.69 Transportation & Infrastructure 897 1.92
Internet and Catalog Retailing 138 0.30 Travel Services 105 0.22
Internet Infrastructure 1 0.00 Water and Waste Management 349 0.75
Internet Software & Services 1008 2.16 Wireless 351 0.75
Total 46758 100.00
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Appendix 5: Number of M&As based on Target Industry 
Target Mid Industry
Mid Industry No. % Mid Industry No. %
Advertising & Marketing 546 1.17 IT Consulting & Services 1474 3.15
Aerospace & Defense 227 0.49 Legal Services 9 0.02
Agriculture & Livestock 302 0.65 Machinery 1091 2.33
Alternative Energy Sources 85 0.18 Metals & Mining 3504 7.49
Alternative Financial Investments 90 0.19
Motion Pictures / Audio
Visual
373 0.80
Apparel Retailing 139 0.30 National Agency 1 0.00
Asset Management 552 1.18 Non Residential 352 0.75
Automobiles & Components 691 1.48 Oil & Gas 2372 5.07
Automotive Retailing 158 0.34 Other Consumer Products 986 2.11
Banks 3498 7.48 Other Energy & Power 196 0.42
Biotechnology 366 0.78 Other Financials 1989 4.25
Broadcasting 277 0.59 Other Healthcare 1 0.00
Brokerage 514 1.10 Other High Technology 26 0.06
Building/Construction & Engineering 1381 2.95 Other Industrials 886 1.89
Cable 152 0.33 Other Materials 217 0.46
Casinos & Gaming 91 0.19 Other Media & Entertainment 9 0.02
Chemicals 781 1.67 Other Real Estate 936 2.00
City Agency 1 0.00 Other Retailing 433 0.93
Computers & Electronics Retailing 141 0.30 Other Telecom 73 0.16
Computers & Peripherals 812 1.74 Paper & Forest Products 394 0.84
Construction Materials 521 1.11 Petrochemicals 138 0.30
Containers & Packaging 299 0.64 Pharmaceuticals 856 1.83
Credit Institutions 257 0.55 Pipelines 100 0.21
Discount and Department Store 
Retailing
134 0.29 Power 567 1.21
Diversified Financials 42 0.09 Professional Services 1893 4.05
Ecommerce / B2B 146 0.31 Public Administration 4 0.01
Educational Services 201 0.43 Publishing 501 1.07
Electronics 845 1.81
Real Estate Management &
Development
243 0.52
Employment Services 235 0.50 Recreation & Leisure 263 0.56
Food & Beverage Retailing 604 1.29 REITs 398 0.85
Food and Beverage 1287 2.75 Residential 53 0.11
Government Sponsored Enterprises 8 0.02 Semiconductors 702 1.50
Healthcare Equipment & Supplies 1134 2.43 Software 2207 4.72
Healthcare Providers & Services 
(HMOs)
575 1.23 Space and Satellites 19 0.04




Home Improvement Retailing 76 0.16 Telecommunications Services 660 1.41
Hospitals 164 0.35 Textiles & Apparel 577 1.23
Hotels and Lodging 298 0.64 Tobacco 31 0.07




Insurance 831 1.78 Travel Services 133 0.28
Internet and Catalog Retailing 112 0.24 Water and Waste Management 346 0.74
Internet Infrastructure 1 0.00 Wireless 324 0.69
Internet Software & Services 1018 2.18 Total 46758 100.00
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) Total %
(1) Consumer Products &
Services
1265 107 69 170 2 163 379 263 130 133 62 106 31 2880 6.16
(2) Consumer Staples 142 1600 43 124 0 75 53 137 163 41 58 125 10 2571 5.50
(3) Energy and Power 95 25 2822 180 0 15 96 301 196 29 27 36 36 3858 8.25
(4) Financials 264 103 139 6047 3 87 268 229 227 136 192 78 53 7826 16.74
(5) Government &
Agencies
1 0 0 1 0 2 0 1 3 0 1 0 0 9 0.02
(6) Healthcare 300 38 16 86 0 2339 104 97 67 16 29 62 14 3168 6.78
(7) High Technology 516 38 99 263 0 127 4769 387 149 290 48 111 395 7192 15.38
(8) Industrials 360 106 268 249 1 107 463 3050 446 76 199 88 92 5505 11.77
(9) Materials 147 164 268 199 0 80 152 461 4170 54 90 31 26 5842 12.49
(10) Media &
Entertainment
254 26 10 88 0 15 314 58 41 1488 52 80 68 2494 5.33
(11) Real Estate 60 21 24 213 0 40 39 111 54 91 1153 40 9 1855 3.97
(12) Retail 136 124 21 94 0 31 89 66 36 58 61 1012 10 1738 3.72
(13) Telecommunications 78 9 25 67 0 15 505 86 34 98 10 28 865 1820 3.89
Total 3618 2361 3804 7781 6 3096 7231 5247 5716 2510 1982 1797 1609 46758 100
%. 7.74 5.05 8.14 16.64 0.01 6.62 15.46 11.22 12.22 5.37 4.24 3.84 3.44 100
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